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The Proposed Data Protection Regulation and
Its Potential Impact on Social Sciences
Research in the UK
Leslie Stevens*
This article critically assesses the potential impact of the proposed Data Protection Regula-
tion on the undertaking of social sciences research in the UK, providing practical analysis
from the perspective of research involving administrative data. This assessment reveals how
changes to the key concepts of anonymisation, personal data and lawfulness may impact
upon social sciences research. The approach taken to the regulation of personal versus
anonymised data in the proposed Regulation represents a disproportionate and de-contex-
tualised response to the risks involved in undertaking social sciences research that may cre-
ate disincentives for investing in privacy protective mechanisms. It is positive that there is
explicit recognition of research as a legitimate form of data processing. However, negative
implications will arise from the introduction of pseudonymous data as a subset of personal
data, without proportionate consideration of varying processing contexts and factors sur-
rounding de-identification and specifically, the strict security measures taken to prohibit de-
identification in the research context.
I. Introduction
Three years have passed since the EuropeanCommis-
sion introduced theproposedGeneralDataProtection
Regulation (‘GDPR’)1 – three drafts have since been
released providing an opportunity to approximate
what will be the final outcome of trilogue negotia-
tions (expected by the end of 2015).2 Even after the
enactment of the GDPR, there will be a transition
phase from current Member State law based on the
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD).3Given the
drastic changes introduced in the GDPR from the
* Research Fellow, Administrative Research Centre Scotland and
PhD Candidate Mason Institute, University of Edinburgh School
of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Graeme Laurie
for his contributions to and help in revising initial drafts of this
article, as well as to Judith Rauhofer and to peer reviewers for
their helpful comments. This work was supported by the Econom-
ic and Social Research Council grant number ES/L007487/1
(Administrative Data Research Centre - Scotland). All websites
were accessed on 30 July 2015.
1 ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data’ [2012] COM (2012) 11 final. (Hereinafter ‘GDPR’) To
distinguish between the Commission’s draft, Parliament’s draft and
the Council’s most recent general approach, references will be
made to the ‘Tripartite Version’ of the GDPR released in 2015 that
provides all three in tandem. It will be cited to as e.g. GDPR,
Tripartite Version, Parliament, art 3; if no reference is being made
to a particular draft, only the relevant article will be cited to. See:
GDPR, Tripartite Version -<http://amberhawk.typepad.com/files/
eu-council-dp-reg-4column-2015_april.pdf>. The Council’s re-
cently adopted general approach is available here: Council of the
European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) -
Preparation of a General Approach’ <http://data.consilium.europa
.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf>.
2 ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data’ [2012] COM (2012) 11 final; European Parliament legisla-
tive resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection
Regulation) (COM(2012)0011, C7-0025/2012) (2014) <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> ; Council
of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individu-
als with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regula-
tion) - Preparation of a General Approach’ <http://data.consilium
.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf>.
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data. (Here-
inafter ‘DPD’)
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DPD’s current legal position it is imperative that those
involved indataprocessingwithin theEUunderstand
these changes and how it is likely to impact their in-
teractions with data subjects. This article critically as-
sesses the potential impact of the GDPR on social sci-
ences research in the UK from the particular perspec-
tive of research involving administrative data, which
are data originally collected by public sector organi-
sations in their administration of local, regional and
national government. Social sciences research carried
out under the auspices of theUK’sAdministrativeDa-
taResearchNetwork (‘ADRN’)will specifically be con-
sidered.4 The resulting analysis demonstrates how
key concepts in the GDPR diverge from the current
legal position under the DPD, which presents both
positive and potentially negative implications for the
undertaking of social sciences research in the UK.
1. Potential implications for social sciences
research involving administrative data
In 2013, the UK Government’s Economic and Social
Research Council (‘ESRC’) invested over £34 million
to establish four administrative data research centres
(‘ADRC’) that formed the UK’s Administrative Data
Research Network (‘ADRN’).5 The ADRN represents
‘aUK-widepartnershipbetweenuniversities, govern-
ment departments and agencies, national statistics
authorities, the third sector, funders and re-
searchers.’6 Through each ADRC, in Northern Ire-
land, Scotland,Wales and England, the ADRN assists
‘accredited researchers [to] carry out social and eco-
nomic research using linked, de-identified adminis-
trative data – information which is routinely collect-
ed by government organisations.’7 Access to de-iden-
tified data is provided under strict governance mea-
sures to safeguard individuals’ rights and interests
in their data. These safeguards include a robust
process of de-identification involving ‘Trusted Third
Parties’ so that researchers never have access to iden-
tifiable data;8 access that is provided only in secure
andmonitored settings;9 and procedural safeguards,
including an approvals panel to ensure each applica-
tion for access represents research which is scientif-
ically sound, non-commercial, ethical and demon-
strates a clear potential public benefit.10
The social sciences research carried out under the
auspices of the ADRN relies upon access to de-iden-
tified administrative data, which are originally col-
lected by public sector organisations in their admin-
istration of government and delivery of public ser-
vices. The reuse of data originally collected for pur-
poses other than research is commonplace across the
social sciences but also in context with health and
biomedical research. In terms of social sciences re-
search and administrative data, the latter encapsu-
late a wide range of information, including data on
births and marriages, income level, social welfare
benefits, individuals’ housing status, education lev-
els, incidenceof crime, childwelfare, etc.11TheGDPR
has the potential to disrupt the already robust legal,
technical and organisational arrangements (refer-
enced above) which provide safeguarded access to
administrative data for research which serves the
public interest12 in ‘promoting and improving eco-
nomic growth, personal and social well-being, and
maximising the interests of current and future gen-
erations of citizens in the UK.’13
However, there are both positive and negative im-
plications for research to be drawn from the intro-
duction of the GDPR, in consideration of the gener-
al direction taken in all three drafts regarding the
concepts of anonymisation, personal data and law-
fulness. Understanding the wider implications of
4 Administrative Data Research Network, ‘About Us’ (2015) <http://
adrn.ac.uk/about>.
5 Economic and Social Research Council, ‘The Big Data Family Is
Born - David Willetts MP Announces the ESRC Big Data Network’
(10 October 2013) <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-and-events/press
-releases/28673/the-big-data-family-is-borndavid-willetts-mp
-announces-the-esrc-big-data-network.aspx>.
6 Administrative Data Research Network, ‘About Us’ (n 4).
7 Administrative Data Research Network, ‘About Us’ (n 4) (empha-
sis added).
8 ADRN, ‘Trusted Third Parties’ <http://adrn.ac.uk/protecting
-privacy/de-identified-data/trusted-third-parties>.
9 ADRN, ‘Secure Environment’ <http://adrn.ac.uk/protecting
-privacy/secure-environment>.
10 ADRN, ‘Protecting Privacy: Project Approval’ (2015) <http://adrn
.ac.uk/protecting-privacy/project-approval>.
11 ADRN, ‘Administrative Data’ <http://adrn.ac.uk/admin-data>.
12 For instance research that addresses issues in social mobility
improves understanding of access and support needs for social care
of the elderly, informs policies designed to tackle poverty, provides
evidence on issues affecting social care for children, etc. See:
Administrative Data Taskforce, ‘The UK Administrative Data Re-
search Network: Improving Access for Research and Policy’ (ESRC,
MRC and Wellcome Trust 2012) 1 <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/
ADT-Improving-Access-for-Research-and-Policy_tcm8-24462.pdf>.
13 Graeme Laurie and Leslie Stevens, ‘The Administrative Data
Research Centre Scotland: A Scoping Report on the Legal & Ethi-
cal Issues Arising from Access & Linkage of Administrative Data’
[2014] Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2014/35
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487971>.
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these particular legislative changes is crucial for the
social sciences research community given that the
GDPR is now in the final phase of trilogue negotia-
tions.14While all three drafts of the GDPR have been
released on the basis that ‘nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed’15, positions taken on these fun-
damental concepts reveal major shifts from the cur-
rent legal position that will undoubtedly impact re-
search. As of June 2015, a general approach to the
GDPR has been agreed by the Council of Ministers
of the European Union (‘the Council’), which pro-
vides a compromise position between the European
Commission (‘the Commission’) and the European
Parliament’s (‘the Parliament’) drafts of the GDPR.16
2. Outline
The article begins in Section II with an overview of
the current legal arrangements that govern andmake
possible the use of administrative data in social sci-
ences research in the UK, from the perspective of the
ADRN. Subsection 1 then contrasts existing concep-
tions of anonymisation and identifiability under the
DPD, to the changes introduced by the GDPR that un-
doubtedly recognise, more fully, the limits to
anonymisation. The potential implications of this
new standard of anonymisation and identifiability
for social sciences research are explored in detail.
This analysis leads to Subsection 2, which provides
an assessment of the related changes made to the de-
finition of personal data in the GDPR, focussing on
the formal addition of pseudonymous data as a sub-
set, which has serious implications for research. Sub-
section 3 reflects on the positive addition of a legal
ground for processing on the basis of conducting re-
search, without the need to rely on an additional
ground such as consent. Section III concludes the ar-
ticle with more explicit consideration of the poten-
tial benefits to social sciences research from the in-
creased recognition of research as a valuable form of
processing in itself, while offering an assessment of
the potentially negative impact of introducing the
new ‘sub-category’ of personal data in ‘pseudony-
mous data’ without allowance for more nuanced and
proportionate consideration of the issues at stake for
individual data subjects’ andwider societal interests.
II. Legal basis for processing
administrative data for research
Prior to the establishment of the ADRN, the UK’s Ad-
ministrative Data Taskforce Report in 2012 (‘The UK
Administrative Data Research Network: Improving
Access for Research and Policy’) considered the un-
tapped value of administrative data resources in the
UK and supported themore efficient use of these un-
der-utilised resources for the public good:
National administrative data collections held by
government departments or agencies that relate to
persons and/or organisations have the potential to
providea robustUK-wideevidencebase thatwould
contribute a richnewresource for researchandpol-
icy making and evaluation. Improving access to
and linkagebetweenadministrativedatasets for re-
search and statistical purposeswould have demon-
strable effects on economic growth andwouldhelp
us respond more effectively to challenges related
to the health and well-being of people.17
Access to relevant and quality data is crucial to the
undertaking of scientifically sound and ethically ro-
bust social sciences research. However, this need
must always be tempered by considerations for the
rights and interests of data subjects. In context of ad-
ministrative data, and thus data originally collected
bypublic sector organisations in the course of admin-
istering government, the protection of individuals’
rights and interests in their data are of the utmost
importance, not least because ‘Individuals are often
under a statutory obligation to provide personal da-
ta to the relevant authorities meaning that they lack
a freedom of choice: they have to disclose personal
data.’18 The often-obligatory nature of the collection
of administrative data provides a persuasive argu-
ment in favour of strong data protection in context
14 European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘Data Protec-
tion: Council Agrees on a General Approach’ (15 June 2015)
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/
06/15-jha-data-protection/>.
15 ‘Data Protection: Council Agrees on General Principles and the
“One Stop Shop” Mechanism’ (Consilium) <http://www.consilium
.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/13-data-protection
-council-agrees-general-principles-and-one-stop-shop
-mechanism/>.
16 European Council, Council of the European Union (n 15).
17 Administrative Data Taskforce (n 12).
18 Peter Blume, ‘The Public Sector and the Forthcoming EU Data
Protection Regulation’ 1 European Data Protection Law Review
32, 33 (emphasis added).
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of the reuse of public sector data for research.19 This
is why under the auspices of the ADRN, only ap-
proved and accredited social sciences researchers can
obtain access to de-identified administrative data
through a robust process facilitated by Trusted Third
Parties.20 This process provides robust safeguards
against re-identification of individuals, either direct-
ly or indirectly.21 Ensuring data are neither directly
nor indirectly identifiable is crucial to the protection
of individuals’ rights and interests whereby effective
anonymisation means that the DPDwill not apply to
such processing.
1. The current standard of anonymisation
Access to previously existing data sets (such as ad-
ministrative data) is often provided to researchers on
the basis that such data are effectively anonymised
prior to access being granted. For data to be consid-
ered effectively anonymised and thus outwith the
scope of the DPD, datamust be ‘rendered anonymous
in such a way that the data subject is no longer iden-
tifiable’ and that identification is ‘no longer possi-
ble’.22 No further guidance is provided in the DPD as
to the required standard of anonymisation but the
Article 29 Working Party provides guidance that
Recital 26 requires ‘that data must be processed in
such a way that it can no longer be used to identify a
natural person by using “all the means likely reason-
ably to be used” by either the controller or a third par-
ty’ (this references the part of Recital 26 relating to
identifiability and determining what data are identi-
fiable and thus personal data).23 The Working Party
further stipulates that anonymisation should be irre-
versible,24which is an arguably stricter standard than
compared to that proposed by the UK’s Information
Commissioner’sOffice (ICO) in their ‘Anonymisation
Code of Practice’ that ‘you must be able to mitigate
the risk of identificationuntil it is remote.’25TheUK’s
ICO guidance on anonymisation remains relevant in
context of research undertaken in the UK and thus
subject to the UK Data Protection Act 1998. In con-
sidering the ADRN’s robust process of de-identifica-
tion, especially their use of Trusted Third Parties and
other technicalmeasures toprohibit re-identification,
it would seem that even with such safeguards, the
processing would notmeet the higher standard of ir-
reversible anonymisation proposed by the Article 29
Working Party in their anonymisation guidance.
Howeverwhen considering theWorkingParty’s2007
guidance on personal data, ADRN’s arrangements
seemingly do meet the requisite standard:
In other areas of research… re-identification of the
data subjectmay have been excluded in the design
of protocols and procedure, for instance because
there is no therapeutical aspects involved ... [and]
identification is not supposed or expected to take
place under any circumstance, and appropriate
technical measures (e.g. cryptographic, irre-
versible hashing) have been put in place to pre-
vent that from happening. In this case, even if
identification of certain data subjects may take
placedespite all thoseprotocols andmeasures (due
to unforeseeable circumstances such as accidental
matching of qualities of the data subject that re-
veal his/her identity), the information processed
by the original controller may not be considered
to relate to identified or identifiable individuals
taking account of all the means likely reasonably
to be used by the controller or by any other per-
son. Its processing may thus not be subject to the
provisions of the Directive.26
While it is unclear how this 2007 guidance on per-
sonal data coincides with the Working Party’s 2014
guidance on anonymisation (and thus the ‘irre-
versible’ standard referenced above), it would seem
that if the ADRN ensures that re-identification is not
to occur under any circumstances, with robust tech-
19 Blume (n 18) 34.
20 The term de-identification is used to refer to data that are
anonymised on an individual level, where data may no longer be
traced back to individual, nor directly or indirectly identifiable to
the researcher. This is made possible through the use of Trusted
Third Parties for the de-identification process, as supported by
highly regulated access in safe settings, all being subject to the
strictest of organisational measures, approvals and training. See:
ADRN (n 8); ADRN (n 9).
21 ADRN (n 8).
22 DPD, recital 26.
23 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (2014) WP216 29 5 <http://ec.europa
.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion
-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf>.
24 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 29.
25 The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Anonymisation: Manag-
ing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice’ (2012) 6 <https://ico
.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf>.
26 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data’ (2007) 01248/07/EN WP 136 29 20
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/
wp136_en.pdf> (emphasis added).
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nicalmeasures beingput in place to prevent this from
happening, the processing of such de-identified ad-
ministrative datawould not be subject to theDPD. (Ir-
respective of suchprocessingbeing outwith the scope
of the DPD, the initial transfer of data is still subject
to administrative law i.e. public sector bodies’ govern-
ing legislation. Even where data are de-identified pri-
or to access being granted to a researcher, a public or-
ganisation must substantiate the legal grounds that
support the transfer of data in the first place.27)
2. A stricter standard of identifiability
Given that current access to and the use of adminis-
trative data in research is based upon the fact that
such data are effectively de-identified (and thus out-
with the scope of theDPD and thus theUK’sData Pro-
tection Act 1998), any changes made to the standard
of anonymisation, from the current legal position, are
of crucial concern. While anonymous data would re-
mainoutwith thescopeof regulationunder theGDPR,
the standard, which determines when data are iden-
tifiable, and in turn, determines what are effectively
non-identifiable, or anonymised data, is stricter than
under the DPD. Recital 23, which stipulates the exclu-
sion of anonymous data from the GDPR’s scope, is al-
most identical toRecital 26 of theDPD in each of draft
of the proposed legislation: see Table 1.
As under the DPD, the standard of anonymisation
is directly related to the concept of identifiability,
which determines what are or are not personal data.
Under the DPD, data are considered identifiable by
taking into account ‘all the means likely reasonably
to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person’, a standard reflect-
ed in the Article 29 Working Party’s guidance on
anonymisation28 and personal data29 as well as that
provided by the UK’s ICO.30 However, Recital 23 of
the GDPR offers a more robust standard of identifi-
ability (notably in Parliament and the Council’s
drafts): see Table 2.
Both Parliament and the Council’s draft Recital 23
curtail current understandings of identifiability, and
thus anonymisation, under both the DPD andUK da-
ta protection law. While the Commission’s draft
Recital 23 essentially transposes the current legal po-
sition on identifiability,31 Parliament’s draft extends
this concept to include data which not only identifies
27 For consideration of the legal grounds which justify the use of
administrative data for research under current law in the UK see:
Laurie and Stevens (n 13). See also: Ministry of Justice, ‘The
Data Sharing Protocol: Annex H, Legal Guidance on Data Shar-
ing’ (27 July 2012) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20150730125042/http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
information-access-rights/data-sharing/annex-h-data-sharing.pdf>;
The Law Commission, ‘Data Sharing Between Public Bodies - A
Scoping Report’ (2014) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/
docs/lc351_data-sharing.pdf>.
28 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23).
29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data’ (n 26).
30 The Information Commissioner’s Office (n 25) 6; The Information
Commissioner’s Office, ‘Determining What Is Personal Data’
(2012) 8 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/
1554/determining-what-is-personal-data.pdf>.
31 Compare DPD, recital 26 to GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commis-
sion, recital 23.
DPD,
Recital 26
GDPR, Commission, Recital
23
GDPR, Parliament, Recital 23 GDPR, Council, Recital 23
[Whereas] the principles of
protection shall not apply to
The principles of data protec-
tion should not apply to data
The principles of data pro-
tection should therefore not
The principles of data protec-
tion should therefore not ap-
data rendered anonymous in rendered anonymous in such apply to anonymous data ply to anonymous informa-
such a way that the data sub- a way that the data subject is rendered anonymous in such tion, that is information
ject is no longer identifiable. no longer identifiable. a way that the data subject is which does not relate to an
[DPD, recital 26 (emphasis
added).]
(GDPR, Tripartite Version,
Commission, recital 23.)
no longer identifiable, which
is information that does not
identified or identifiable nat-
ural person or to data ren-
relate to an identified or dered anonymous in such a
identifiable natural per- way that the data subject is
son.(GDPR, Tripartite Ver-
sion, Parliament, recital 23.)
not or no longer identifi-
able.(GDPR, Tripartite Ver-
sion, Council, recital 23.)
Table 1
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a natural person but also which singles them out, di-
rectly or indirectly. While the Council’s text differs,
as it does not mention the words ‘single out’, their
text specifically categorises pseudonymous data as
identifiable to the extent that such data ‘could be at-
tributed to a natural person by the use of additional
information’.32Pseudonymisation is characterisedby
the Article 29 Working Party on the basis that it still
permits the ‘singling out’ of individuals, despite its
use of de-identification techniques.33 On this inter-
pretation, the Council’s version of Recital 23 may be
considered a less explicit inclusion of ‘singling out’
which nevertheless would have the same impact on
research carried out using de-identified, individual
level records. A compromise position is likely to re-
sult from the Parliament’s draft and Council’s gener-
al position, which, as a result, is likely to enhance the
standard of identifiability above current understand-
ings that only revolve around whether data identify
an individual, not single them out.
a. Singling out of individuals
The characterisation of data, which ‘singles out’ an
individual, as personal data, represents a drastic en-
largement of the concept of personal data and iden-
tifiability; something called for by privacy scholars34
in response to ever evolving and sophisticated tech-
niques in data linkages, the emergence of big data35
and the acknowledged fallibility of anonymisation.36
32 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 23.
33 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 10.
34 For example: Paul M Schwartz and Daniel J Solove, ‘The PII
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable
Information’ (2011) 86 New York University Law Review 1814,
1877–1888.
35 Paul Ohm, ‘The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data’ (2013) 161
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online 339; Solon Baro-
cas and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data’s End Run around
Anonymity and Consent’ in Julia Lane and others (eds), Privacy,
Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement
(Kindle, Cambridge University Press 2014); Judith Rauhofer,
‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and
the Balance of Power in the Information Age’ (2014) 2014 Univer-
sity of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper Series <http://
www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/round-and-round
-the-garden(96582df3-858a-4e1f-9172-01124219c0c0).html>.
36 Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, ‘De-Anonymizing
Social Networks’, 30th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy
(2009) <https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak09.pdf>;
Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surpris-
ing Failure of Anonymization’ (2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701.
DPD,
Recital 26
GDPR, Commission, Recital
23
GDPR, Parliament, Recital 23 GDPR, Council, Recital 23
[Whereas], to determine
whether a person is identifi-
To determine whether a per-
son is identifiable, account
To determine whether a per-
son is identifiable, account
To determine whether a per-
son is identifiable, account
able, account should be tak- should be taken of all the should be taken of all the should be taken of all the
en of all the means likely rea- means likely reasonably to means likely reasonably like- means likely reasonably to
sonably to be used either by be used either by the con- ly to be used either by the be used either by the con-
the controller or by any oth- troller or by any other per- controller or by any other troller or by any other per-
er person to identify the said son to identify the individ- person to identify or single son to identify the individual
person. [DPD, recital 26 (em-
phasis added).]
ual. (GDPR, Tripartite Ver-
sion, Commission, recital
23.)
out the individual directly or
indirectly. To ascertain
whether means are reason-
directly or indirectly.
To ascertain whether means
are reasonable likely to be
ably likely to be used to iden- used to identify the individ-
tify the individual, account ual, account should be taken
should be taken of all objec- of all objective factors, such
tive factors, such as the costs as the costs of and the
of and the amount of time amount of time required for
required for identification, identification, taking into
taking into consideration consideration both available
both available technology at technology at the time of the
the time of the processing processing and technological
and technological develop- development. (GDPR, Tripar-
ment. (GDPR, Tripartite Ver-
sion, Parliament, recital 23.)
tite Version, Council, recital
23.)
Table 2
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This approach to ‘singling out’ has been advocated
by the Article 29 Working Party. After the general
approach to the GDPR was agreed on 15 June 2015,
the Working Party wrote to the European Commis-
sion urging them to retain the notion of ‘singling out’
in the final version of the GDPR as the explicit ter-
minology was not retained from the Parliament’s
text:
To ensure the general objective of maintaining a
high-level of protection of personal data is upheld,
personal data should be defined in a broad man-
ner in line with technological evolution. The def-
inition of personal data should therefore take in-
to account the situation in which people can be
“singled out” on the basis of identifiers.37
It remains unclear how the inclusion of ‘singling out’
in the concept of identifiability will impact upon re-
search where access to data is strictly governed and
re-identification is both prohibited and secured
against through appropriate technical measures. Al-
thoughADRN accredited researchers will never have
access to data, which has directly or indirectly iden-
tifiable information, it could be that because such da-
ta are at the individual level, rather than aggregate
level,38 that it may come within scope of the GDPR
as data which ‘singles out’ an individual. This is so
even ifwe consider the caveat carved out for research
processing in Parliament and the Council’s draft
Recital 23 which stipulates that the GDPR does not
concern the processing of anonymous informa-
tion/data for statistical and research purposes.39
While there is no explicit connection made in the
GDPR between ‘anonymous data’ on the one hand,
and either aggregate level or individual level de-iden-
tified data, it is likely that in the inclusion of ‘singling
out’ by Parliament and ‘pseudonymous data’ by the
Council in Recital 23, that individual-level de-identi-
fied data may indeed come within the scope of the
GDPR. This interpretation is supported by the fact
that the Article 29 Working Party does connect indi-
vidual level records that are de-identified to pseudo-
nymisation and processing that ‘singles out’ individ-
uals, which are considered to come within full scope
of even the current law.40
The term ‘singling out’ can be traced at least back
to the Article 29 Working Party’s 2013 report on ob-
taining consent for cookies.41 In pertinent part, they
provide:
Users should also be offered a real choice regard-
ing tracking cookies. Such tracking cookies are
generally used to follow individual behaviour
across websites, create profiles based on that be-
haviour, infer interests, and take decisions affect-
ingpeople individually.When trackingcookies are
being used to single out people in this way, they
are likely to be personal data.42
Concerns with causing individual impact on the ba-
sis of singling individuals out in regards to their be-
haviour, interests etc. is valid and should be regulat-
ed in context of the use of cookies. However, this con-
cept of ‘singling out’ can and should be materially
distinguished from the processing of de-identified
data for research by ADRN accredited researchers.
The purpose for using data is an important consider-
ation (despite the Working Party’s later contentions
that ‘it does not matter what the intentions are of the
data controller or recipient’.43) In the case of research
undertaken via the ADRN, it is not their purpose to
track behaviour or individual interests in a way that
affects individuals or will result in the taking of de-
cisions affecting them – in fact such actions are pro-
hibited. Such actions would be entirely inappropri-
ate in context of the use of administrative data for
research purposes.
It is not clear that Recital 23’s inclusion of ‘singling
out’ reflects concerns over individual impact, calling
into question what its inclusion is meant to provide
over and above provisions relating to profiling in e.g.
Article 3(2)(b) andArticle 20 of theGDPR.TheArticle
29 Working Party suggested in 2012 that ‘singling
37 ‘Letter from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on
Trilogue to Ms Vera Jourova, Commissioner for Justice, Con-
sumers and Gender Equality of the European Commission’ (17
June 2015) 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article
-29/documentation/other-document/files/2015/20150617_letter
_from_the_art29_wp_on_trilogue_to_msjourova.pdf>.
38 Anonymised records on the individual level versus aggregate,
population level statistics.
39 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament and Council, recital 23.
40 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 10.
41 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document
02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining Consent for Cookies’
(2013) WP 208 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/
wp208_en.pdf>.
42 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document
02/2013 Providing Guidance on Obtaining Consent for Cookies’
(n 41) 6.
43 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 10.
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out’ be incorporated into Recital 23 of the Commis-
sion’s original proposal for the GDPR as:
One of themain conclusions of this analysis is that
a natural person can be considered identifiable
when, within a group of persons, he or she can be
distinguished from other members of the group
and consequently be treated differently. It is there-
fore suggested to clarify in Recital 23 and Article
4 that the notion of identifiability also includes
singling out in this way.44
Again, theWorking Party is concerned with singling
out when it would result in treating individuals dif-
ferently, when ‘singling out’ would result in impact
upon individuals. However, this conception of sin-
gling out is disconnected from their 2014 opinion on
anonymisation which instead focuses on the gener-
al risk of re-identification; in 2014, singling out is in-
stead connected directly to pseudonymisation such
that ‘pseudonymised data cannot be equated to
anonymised information as they continue to allow
an individual data subject to be singled out and link-
ableacrossdifferentdata sets’.45Theydefine ‘singling
out’ as ‘the possibility to isolate some or all records
which identify an individual in the dataset’.46 Impor-
tantly, no mention is made of individual impact and
rather they emphasise that ‘“identification” not only
means the possibility of retrieving a person's name
and/or address, but also includes potential identifia-
bility by singling out, linkability and inference.’47
Their 2014 interpretation of ‘singling out’ is detached
from the original (and appropriate) concerns posed
regarding individual impact; the harm which the
Article 29 Working Party would seek to prevent in
regards to ‘singling out’ in their 2012 report on the
GDPR and 2013 cookie consent report.
The Article 29 Working Party’s more recent ap-
proach to ‘singling out’ was seemingly adopted into
the wording of Parliament, and less explicitly in the
Council’s text for Recital 23, representing a departure
from themore proportionate approach offered under
the DPD and previously by the Working Party itself.
Notably, in theWorkingParty’s 2007guidanceonper-
sonal data, it was acknowledged that there would be
circumstances,notably in the researchcontext,where
similar to the arrangements governing the ADRN,
‘identification is not supposed or expected to take
place under any circumstance, and appropriate tech-
nical measures … have been put in place to prevent
that from happening.’48 Such circumstances were
deemed to be outwith the scope of the DPD because
the risks posed to individuals were effectively elimi-
nated to the point of a less than remote possibility.49
‘Singling out’ as reflected in Recital 23 of the GDPR
is disconnected from the original and appropriate
concerns regarding singling out which impacts upon
individuals in a significant way. The crucial effect of
this disconnect is that the full force of the GDPR
would apply to processing that would previously
have been deemed ‘safe’ and outwith the scope of the
GDPR, despite the implementation of appropriate
technical and organisational measures to ensure in-
dividual impact and re-identification will not occur.
Recital 23 clearly demonstrates valid and acknowl-
edged concerns with re-identification, in considera-
tion of the well-known limits to anonymisation.50
Nonetheless, the risks posed by the type of arrange-
ments governing access and use of data by ADRN ac-
credited researchers, in tightly constrained, secured
(monitored settings), are not to be equated with the
high profile cases of data breaches, where supposed-
ly anonymous data were publicly released and later
re-identified.51 In fact, evidence suggests that use of
data in research settings is remarkably safe in con-
trast to themore familiar and publicised instances of
data breaches.52 Further consider the UK’s ESRCAn-
nual Report 2013-2014 (which funds the type of re-
44 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 01/2012 on
the Data Protection Reform Proposals’ (2012) 5 <http://ec.europa
.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion
-recommendation/files/2012/wp191_en.pdf> (emphasis added).
45 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 10.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data’ (n 26) 29.
49 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data’ (n 26).
50 Narayanan and Shmatikov (n 36); Ohm (n 36); Schwartz and
Solove (n 32); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion
05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23).
51 Such as, Ryan Singel, ‘Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback Mountain
Secret, Lawsuit Claims’ <http://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix
-privacy-lawsuit/>; Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller, ‘A Face Is
Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749 - New York Times’
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.
52 For example see the findings of a recent Wellcome Trust report on
data linkages in the health research sector: Public Health Re-
search Data Forum, ‘Enabling Data Linkage to Maximise the
Value of Public Health Research Data’ (Wellcome Trust 2015) 23,
29, 33, 39, 44, <http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/
Spotlight-issues/Data-sharing/Public-health-and-epidemiology/
WTP056860.htm>.
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search discussed in this article) whereby zero ‘pro-
tected personal data-related incidents’ occurred
which required formal reporting to the ICO during
the period of 2011-2014.53
When considering the perspective of publicly
funded and publicly beneficial social sciences re-
search, concerns with ‘open data’ and unsecure use
are not an issue and should not be conflated with the
useofde-identifieddata,whichareonlyeveraccessed
and used under strictly secured and monitored set-
tings, subject to enforceable governance arrange-
ments. It is entirely appropriate, and a welcome ad-
dition for the protection of individuals, that data pro-
cessing which could be used in decisions significant-
ly affecting them is now more strictly regulated in
context with Article 3 and Article 20 of the GDPR.
However, the approach taken to ‘singling out’ in
Recital 23 does not allow for proportionate, risk-
based consideration of differences between types of
data controllers (and their purposes for processing),
processing techniques, de-identification methods
and other safeguards used to protect individuals’
rights and interests in their data.
Consideration of context is vital to proportionate
implementation of a regulation with direct effect
across twenty-eightMember States, whichwill apply
to a variety of necessarily different processing situa-
tions.54 The disproportionate approach taken to sin-
gling out in Recital 23 may have the opposite effect
in acting as a disincentive to use privacy protecting
measureswhich require substantial investment of re-
sources and time, including the use of Trusted Third
Parties in rigorous de-identification techniques and
the deployment of organisational measures such as
safe settings for controlled, monitored access to da-
ta. It is unclear what incentives would remain, to im-
plement costly safeguards, if such processing would
be equated to far less secure processing of fully iden-
tifiable personal data, for less publicly beneficial rea-
sons. Curiously, incentives do remain carved out for
data controllers operating in the private sector given
that the use of cookies and other online identifiers
tocreateprofileson individuals (and thussingle them
out) would seemingly be outwith the scope of the
GDPR so long as said cookies etc. are not combined
with ‘unique identifiers’ or other information in or-
der to identify an individual or make them identifi-
able.55 It is unclear what reasoning could legitimate-
ly support such concessions, in contrast with the
stricter treatment of secure and publicly beneficial
processing for research where profiling of individu-
als in this way is made contrary to the requisite gov-
ernance protocols. The lack of proportionality and
risk-based assessment permitted by this approach,
which impacts upon the most fundamental of data
protection issues in determining what processing is
or is not within the scope of the law, has themost po-
tential to disrupt currently robust legal and techni-
cal arrangements for research.
b. Are pseudonymous data personal data?
WhileRecital 23both explicitly (Parliament’s draft56)
and implicitly (the Council’s draft57) calls into ques-
tion the use of pseudonymous data through the con-
cept of ‘singling out’, changes toArticle 4 of theGDPR
unambiguously creates a new subset of personal da-
ta in the formal addition of pseudonymous data.58
Currently, theDPDdefines personal data in reference
to the definition of a data subject under Article 2(a):
"[Personal] data” shallmean any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person
("data subject"); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particu-
lar by reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, phys-
iological,mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity.59
Now contrast the current definition to those provid-
ed in the drafts to GDPR: see Table 3.
While the Commission’s original proposal does
not significantly expand upon the current legal posi-
53 ESRC, ‘Economic and Social Research Council Annual Report
and Accounts 2013-2014’ (2014) 39 <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/
_images/ESRC%20AR_tcm8-31173.pdf>.
54 Considering the impact of a regulation imposed on both private
and public sector processing see: Blume (n 18).
55 While such processing would remain within the scope of the E-
Privacy Directive art 5(3), from a data protection context, profiling
on this basis would remain largely uninhibited by virtue of Recital
24, contrary to the concerns raised with regard to ‘singling out’
and its potential impact on individuals. GDPR, Tripartite Version,
Council, recital 24.
56 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, recital 23.
57 Recital 23 of the Council’s draft specifically provides that ‘Data
including pseudonymised data, which could be attributed to a
natural person by the use of additional information, should be
considered as information on an identifiable natural person.’ See
GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 23.
58 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, art 4(2)(a) and Council, art
4(3)(b).
59 DPD, art 2(a) (emphasis added).
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tion (only adding locationdata, online identifiers and
genetic data), both Parliament and the Council make
noteworthy changes to expand the concept. First,
both drafts remove the standard of ‘bymeans reason-
ably likely to be used by the controller or by any oth-
er natural or legal person’ an important threshold of
proportionality for determining the identifiability of
data (although retaining it in the guidance provided
by Recital 23). Second, Parliament’s draft Article 4(2)
adds to the definition indirect identification by
unique identifiers,whichwhen read alongsideRecital
23, could implicate de-identified data that are key
coded and provided to researchers.
It is especially unclear how Parliament or the
Council’s definition of ‘personal data’ works along-
side (i) Parliament’s new category of ‘pseudonymous
data’ in Article 4(2)(a), or (ii) Council’s explicit inclu-
sion of ‘pseudonymous data’ in Recital 23 and men-
tion of pseudonymisation in Article 4(3)(b). Parlia-
ment provides an ambiguous definition for pseudo-
nymous data without any reference to ‘unique iden-
tifiers’ or ‘singling out’ of individuals, both of which
implicitly reference the process of pseudonymisa-
tion:
"[Pseudonymous] data" means personal data that
cannot be attributed to a specific data subjectwith-
out the use of additional information, as long as
such additional information is kept separately and
subject to technical and organisational measures
to ensure non-attribution.60
In Recital 23 Parliament specifically defines identifi-
ability on the basis of a data controller or any third
party’s ability ‘to identify or single out the individual
directly or indirectly’.61As discussed at length above,
singling out individuals was indeed introduced in
context of the process of pseudonymisation of data.62
Thus it is unclear what Parliament’s formal addition
of pseudonymous data is intended to provide given
that it stipulates such data cannot be attributed to a
specific data subject without additional information
– does thismean that such data, when ‘kept separate-
ly and subject to technical and organisational mea-
sures to ensure non-attribution’ are outwith the scope
of the GDPR; or do pseudonymous data invoke an
entirelydifferent standardofprotection?Theseques-
tions certainly remain unresolved in consideration
of the ‘lesser’ standard of protection seemingly of-
fered to pseudonymous data in Parliament’s draft as
regards to e.g. the legitimate interests provisions
(Recital 38), profiling (Recital 58(a) Article 10) etc.
Further inconsistencies arise when considering
the Council’s draft Article 4(3)(b) regarding pseudo-
60 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, art 4(2)(a).
61 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, recital 23 (emphasis added).
62 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 01/2012 on
the Data Protection Reform Proposals’ (n 44) 29; Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013
Providing Guidance on Obtaining Consent for Cookies’ (n 41) 29;
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on
Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 23) 29.
GDPR, Commission,
Article 4(1),(2)
GDPR, Parliament,
Article 4(2)
GDPR, Council,
Article 4(1)
(1) '[Data] subject' means an
identified natural person or a
(2) '[Personal] data' means any informa-
tion relating to an identified or identifi-
(1) '[Personal] data' means any informa-
tion relating to an identified or identifi-
natural person who can be able natural person ('data subject'); an able natural person ('data subject'); an
identified, directly or indirectly, by identifiable person is one who can be identifiable person is one who can be
means reasonably likely to be used by identified, directly or indirectly, in par- identified, directly or indirectly (…), in
the controller or by any other natural or ticular by reference to an identifier particular by reference to an identifier
legal person, in particular by reference such as a name, an identification num- such as a name, an identification num-
to an identification number, location ber, location data, unique identifier or ber, location data, online identifier or to
data, online identifier or to one or more to one or more factors specific to the one or more factors specific to the
factors specific to the physical, physio- physical, physiological, genetic, mental, physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
logical, genetic, mental, economic, cul- economic, cultural or social or gender economic, cultural or social identity of
tural or social identity of that person;
(2) 'personal data' means any informa-
identity of that person; [GDPR, Tripar-
tite Version, Parliament, art 4(2) – Par-
that person;[GDPR, Tripartite Version,
Council, art 4(1) (emphasis added).]
tion relating to a data subject; [GDPR,
Tripartite Version, Commission, art
4(1),(2) (emphasis added).]
liament deleted art 4(1) (emphasis
added).]
Table 3
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nymisation when read alongside its provisions re-
garding pseudonymous data in Recital 23. The Coun-
cil defines pseudonymisation as:
[The] processing of personal data in such a way
that the data can no longer be attributed to a spe-
cific data subject without the use of additional in-
formation, as long as such additional information
is kept separately and subject to technical and or-
ganisational measures to ensure non-attribution
to an identified or identifiable person.63
This may not create an explicit or formal category of
pseudonymous data in the way Parliament did, but
the effect is the same (and definition is essentially
identical to that provided by Parliament). Therefore
the Council’s definition of ‘pseudonymisation’ also
presents a pseudo-category of personal data, leaving
it unclear what standard applies. The Council’s
Recital 23 provides that ‘Data including pseudo-
nymised data, which could be attributed to a natur-
al personby theuseof additional information, should
be considered as information on an identifiable nat-
ural person.’64 This characterises pseudonymous da-
ta as personal data; however, the Council perplexing-
ly adds that pseudonymisation is a risk mitigating
measure for protecting data subjects in Recital 23(a)
and then goes on to promote the need to incentivise
use of pseudonymisation in Recital 23(c):
In order to create incentives for applying pseudo-
nymisation when processing personal data, mea-
sures of pseudonymisation whilst allowing gener-
al analysis should be possiblewithin the same con-
trollerwhen the controller has taken technical and
organisational measures necessary to ensure that
the provisions of this Regulation are implement-
ed, taking into account the respective data process-
ing and ensuring that additional information for
attributing the personal data to a specific data sub-
ject is kept separately.65
Again the question remains: What incentives are
there to pseudonymise if pseudonymous data, even
those subject to the most robust technical security
and organisational measures, come within the full
scope of the GDPR? While Recital 23(c) may be par-
tially reminiscent of the more proportionate ap-
proach taken to anonymisation and personal data in
the DPD, UK’s ICO and Article 29 Working Party’s
guidance onpersonal data, the effect is still that pseu-
donymous data would be treated – at least partially
– like fully identifiablepersonaldata.As statedabove,
outwith the research context there may indeed re-
main incentives to pseudonymise data, i.e. in context
with a data controller's use of online identifiers such
as cookies etc. given the concessions made in Recital
24. However, in the context of research, the changes
proposed by Parliament or the Council in regards to
personal data andpseudonymous datawould require
data controllers to demonstrate full compliance with
the provisions of theGDPR, subject to any exceptions
for research use and/or for pseudonymous data. This
presents a disproportionate consideration of the like-
ly risks at stake and sanctions an approach to regu-
lation that lacks context sensitivity. Moreover, it dis-
plays a fundamental misunderstanding of the stan-
dard to which data are de-identified in the context of
social sciences research, such as that supported by
the ADRN.
3. Legitimising research use of
administrative data
In the event that even robustly de-identified data for
research are treated as personal data (or pseudony-
mous data, subject to varying standards of protec-
tion), data controllers involved in social sciences re-
search must be able to legitimise their receipt and
subsequent use of data under the GDPR. In a posi-
tive development for research, the GDPR introduces
a legal ground that explicitly justifies the processing
of personal data on the basis of research (or scientif-
ic) purposes: see Table 4.
Every use of personal data must be lawful. In or-
der to be lawful, use of personal data must be justi-
fied upon one or more legal grounds provided in da-
ta protection law. In the research context this typical-
ly involves obtaining consent from data subjects or
demonstrating that the processing was necessary for
the legitimate interests of the data controller, so long
as the use does not prejudice data subjects’ freedoms,
rights or interests.66 Currently, the use of personal
data cannot be legally justified on the basis of con-
ducting research on its own. That is, use of personal
63 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, art 4(3)(b).
64 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 23(a).
65 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 23(c).
66 DPA, Schedule 2, para 1, 6.
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data for research must be legally justified on the ba-
sis of consent, or another legal ground as provided
under Article 7 of the DPD.
Under the Commission and Parliament’s draft
Article 6, ‘scientific research’ becomes a legal ground
for processing personal data, whereas under the
Council’s Article 6, scientific purposes are instead re-
ferred to.67 Furthermore, legal grounds are provided
underArticle 9 to legitimise processing of special cat-
egories of personal data on the basis of research/ sci-
entific purposes.68 However, legal justification re-
mains conditioned upon the basis of fulfilling the
provisions of Article 83, which specifically considers
the use of data for historical/archival, statistical and
research/scientific purposes. Article 83 is to be read
in tandem with Article 6(2). Under the Commission
and Parliament’s drafts, Article 83 is worded such
thatpersonal datamayonlybeprocessed for research
under specific conditions, whereby the Council’s
draft is more permissive and instead provides that
Article 83 applies where personal data are processed
for research, etc.69
The Commission’s and Parliament’s drafts pro-
vide that data controllers may only rely upon re-
search as a legal justification for processing person-
al data if:
(a) These purposes cannot be otherwise fulfilled
by processing data which does not permit or not
any longer permit the identification of the data
subject;
(b) Data enabling the attribution of information to
an identified or identifiable data subject is kept
separately from the other information under the
highest technical standards, and all necessarymea-
sures are taken to prevent unwarranted re-identifi-
cation of the data subjects.70 (Emphasis showing
the amendments made by Parliament.)
The Commission’s version of Article 83 can be dis-
tinguished from above as it only requires separation
of identifying and non-identifying data to the extent
that research can be fulfilled in this manner71 and
makes specific provision for the disclosure of person-
al data where necessary to present research findings
(important considering many UK funding bodies’
open access policies).72 This more proportionate ap-
proach is not replicated in Parliament’s draft, which
does not provide for publication of research results
and insists that identifiable information always re-
main separate from non-identifiable data.73 The
health research community has been particularly vo-
cal in their concerns over Parliament’s draft Article
83, as ‘This amendment makes the exemption from
consent for the use of health data in research very
narrow, which will prevent valuable research that is
currently legal.’74 As applied to social sciences re-
search, different concerns are raised, and the contin-
ued separation of identifiable data fromde-identified
research data is already standardised in the proce-
67 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission and Council, art 6(2).
68 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art (9)(i).
69 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art 83.
70 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission and Parliament, art
83(1)(a),(b) (emphasis added to show Parliament’s amendment).
71 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission, art 83(1)(b).
72 Publication of research results implicating personal data would be
allowed under the Commission’s proposed Article 83(2(b) so long
as the rights and interests of the individuals do not override this.
GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission, art 83(2)(b).
73 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, art 83(1)(b).
74 Dr Beth Thompson, Policy Adviser, Wellcome Trust, ‘Protecting
Health and Scientific Research in the Data Protection Regulation:
Position of Non-Commercial Research Organisations and Acade-
mics - December 2014’ 19 <http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/
groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web
_document/WTP055584.pdf>.
GDPR, Commission,
Article 6(2)
GDPR, Parliament,
Article 6(2)
GDPR, Council,
Article 6(2)
Processing of personal data which is
necessary for the purposes of historical,
Processing of personal data which is
necessary for the purposes of historical,
Processing of personal data which is
necessary for archiving purposes in the
statistical or scientific research shall be statistical or scientific research shall be public interest, or for historical, statisti-
lawful subject to the conditions and lawful subject also to the conditions cal or scientific purposes shall be lawful
safeguards referred to in Article and safeguards referred to in Article subject also to the conditions and safe-
83.[GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commis-
sion, art 6(2).]
83.[GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parlia-
ment, art 6(2).]
guards referred to in Article 83.[GDPR,
Tripartite Version, Council, art 6(2).]
Table 4
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dure forde-identificationundertakenvia theADRN75
(and likely many other research bodies).
Therefore, even under the more stringent require-
ments of Parliament, Article 83 is not insurmount-
able for social sciences research. The provisions can
be interpreted as simply requiring that the use of per-
sonal data for research is strictly necessary – if the
research can otherwise be conducted with de-identi-
fied data it should do so. Indeed, this standard of ‘ne-
cessity’ is not novel and is already required in sever-
al provisions of current data protection law e.g. DPD,
Article 7(b)-(f).76 Moreover, where de-identified data
are used, Article 83(1)(b) merely signposts to the im-
portant role of the Trusted Third Party in social sci-
ences research to maintain clear separation of iden-
tifiable information and to ensure adherence to ro-
bust security protocol for the transfer and subse-
quent use of de-identified data for research.77
Overall, the explicit recognition of research as a le-
gitimate, legal ground for processing is a positive de-
velopment for social sciences research (and other
forms of research). However, it is important to note
that a data controller’s reliance on Article 6(2) is af-
fected if the processing involves the reuse of data as
opposed to data specifically collected for research
purposes. Much research, including that of the
ADRN, relies upon the reuse of existing data sets,
which are originally collected for purposes other than
research. Therefore, data controllers would need to
demonstrate that their further processing for re-
search is compatible with the original purposes for
collection according to the principle of purpose lim-
itation. Crucially, the Council’s Article 5(1)(b) pro-
vides that ‘further processing of personal data for
archiving purposes in the public interest or scientif-
ic, statistical or historical purposes shall in accor-
dance with Article 83 not be considered incompati-
ble with the initial purposes’.78 According to this ap-
proach, so long as a data controller complies with the
requirements of Article 83 (discussed above) their
reuseofdata for researchwouldautomaticallybecon-
sidered ‘compatible’ and in compliancewith theprin-
ciple of purpose limitation. However it is crucial to
consider whether the law is enough to justify com-
patibility in all cases: Should research (of any type,
presumably also including commercial/market re-
search) always be considered compatible with the
purposes of original collection? Article 83 does pro-
vide certain safeguards to individuals in regards to
research, making the determination of compatibili-
ty contingent upon these provisions being satisfied.
But as made abundantly clear from recent experi-
ences in the health research context, namely care.da-
ta in the UK,79 legal sanction does not equate to so-
cial licence and public acceptability. More careful
consideration is needed to affect a proportionate bal-
ance between the public interest in both the protec-
tion of individual privacy and in certain research us-
es of data.
Nevertheless, data controllers can rely upon
Article 6(2) as their lawful justification for reuse of
data for research, subject to a determination of com-
patibility and compliance with Article 83. In cases
where data controllers are unable to comply with the
requirements of Article 83, another lawful basis un-
der Article 6 would need to be satisfied for the pro-
cessing to be considered lawful when data are reused
for research. In such cases, obtaining consent may
become important and the GDPR does make it in-
creasingly difficult to obtain valid consent, especial-
ly in the research context, given the specificity re-
quired and the impact of rights to withdrawal.80 For
consent to be considered valid under the Commis-
sion and Parliament’s draft it must be ‘freely given
specific, informed and explicit’81 while the Council
provides that consent must be ‘freely-given, specific,
and informed’.82Moreover, the Commission and Par-
liament provide in Recital 25 that ‘Consent should
be given explicitly by any appropriate method en-
abling a freely given specific and informed indica-
tion of the data subject's wishes’83 in contrast to ‘un-
75 ADRN (n 8).
76 For example consider Article 7 of the current Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC – all legal grounds for processing, with the
exception of obtaining individual consent, are conditioned
upon the processing being necessary for the particular purposes
relied upon. This approach is mirrored in the UK’s DPA 1998,
Schedule 2.
77 Although, it remains unclear what is meant by ‘the highest
technical standards.’ GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, art
83(1)(b).
78 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art 5(1)(b).
79 Olivia Solon, ‘The Communication of Care.data to Patients Has
Been an Absolute Shambles’ <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/
archive/2014-02/07/care-data-terrible-communication>; Pam
Carter, Graeme T Laurie and Mary Dixon-Woods, ‘The Social
Licence for Research: Why Care.data Ran into Trouble’ [2015]
Journal of Medical Ethics <http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/
2015/01/23/medethics-2014-102374.abstract>.
80 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art 7.
81 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission and Parliament, art 4(8).
82 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, art 4(8).
83 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Commission and Parliament, recital 25.
EDPL 2|2015110 The Proposed Data Protection Regulation
ambiguous’ consent provided by the Council.84 All
drafts require the data controller to demonstrate that
consent was obtained under these more rigorous
terms85 and clearly distinguish, and in practice sep-
arate, requests for consent for different purposes.86
Parliament’s draft Article 7 diverges in that consent
would be considered void if obtained without clear
separation of consent for different purposes, which
would threaten any prospect for broad consent.87
A more positive outcome for research is reflected
in the Council’s Recital 25 which allows broad con-
sent to scientific research areas:
It is often not possible to fully identify the pur-
pose of data processing for scientific purposes at
the time of data collection. Therefore data subjects
can give their consent to certain areas of scientif-
ic research when in keeping with recognised eth-
ical standards for scientific research. Data subjects
should have the opportunity to give their consent
only to certain areas of research or parts of re-
searchprojects to the extent allowedby the intend-
ed purpose andprovided that this does not involve
disproportionate efforts in view of the protective
purpose.88
This official recognition of the value of broad con-
sent is crucial for longitudinal studies, and beneficial
to social sciences research overall. Themethods used
to produce scientifically sound and ethically robust
social sciences research are not as formulaic or de-
fined at the outset (as would be the case in biomed-
ical or clinical research).89 These factors make in-
formed consent difficult to obtain, especially under
the enhanced standards provided in Article 7 of the
GDPR. There are fundamental differences between
clinical and biomedical research and social sciences
research; whereas the formermay involve serious in-
terventions (physical) on the individual, and there-
fore the risks posed are oftenmore severe,90 research
which instead solely relies upon the reuse of data
originally collected elsewhere (which may also in-
clude health research) poses substantially different
types of risk (and often less risk) to individuals, es-
pecially when considering the robust de-identifica-
tion processes and other safeguards implemented by
organisations like the ADRN. Therefore the introduc-
tion of a specific legal ground to justify the process-
ing of data on the basis of research itself, in combi-
nationwith thedeclarationof compatibility inArticle
5(1)(b), is especially beneficial to social sciences re-
search that relies upon the reuse of de-identified ad-
ministrative data.
III. Concluding thoughts
The implications of the GDPR are not wholly nega-
tive for social sciences research. In fact, there is in-
creased and explicit recognition of the importance of
research (helpfully defined to include ‘fundamental
research, applied research, and privately funded re-
search’91) throughout the GDPR. This is a positive de-
velopment for social sciences research for a number
of reasons. Unlike under the DPD, the GDPR explic-
itly recognises research as a valuable formof process-
ing in itself, demonstrated through the addition of a
legal ground on the basis of research and in several
new provisions dedicated to research e.g. Recital
25(aa), Article 83 etc. Furthermore, the addition of a
separate legal ground for research diminishes the
prominence and ‘fetishisation of consent’, which has
been considered an impoverished way of protecting
individual’s rights and other interests in their data,
as consent is not necessarily indicative of data being
adequately protected nor data subjects’ rights and in-
terests being respected.92 In fact:
[It] is conceivable that processing can take place
lawfully (with a valid legal basis) butwithoutwhat
84 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 25 and art 6(1)(a).
85 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art 7(1).
86 GDPR, Tripartite Version, art 7(2).
87 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Parliament, art 7(2).
88 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 25(aa).
89 David Erdos, ‘Constructing the Labyrinth: The Impact of Data
Protection on the Development of “Ethical” Regulation in Social
Science’ (2012) 15 Information Communication and Society 104;
David Erdos, ‘Systematically Handicapped? Social Research in
the Data Protection Framework’ (2011) 20 Information Communi-
cation and Society 83; David Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket? Social
Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (2011) 19
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 133;
Robert Dingwall, ‘The Ethical Case against Ethical Regulation in
Humanities and Social Science Research’ (2008) 3 21st Century
Society: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences 1.
90 Dingwall (n 89).
91 GDPR, Tripartite Version, recital 126.
92 Graeme Laurie and Emily Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What Is the
Legal Status of the Consent Form in Health-Related Research?’
(2012) Medical Law Review <http://medlaw.oxfordjournals.org/
content/early/2012/10/09/medlaw.fws031.abstract>; Graeme Lau-
rie and Shawn Harmon, ‘Through the Thicket and Across the
Divide: Successfully Navigating the Regulatory Landscape in Life
Sciences Research’ (2013) 30 University of Edinburgh, Research
Paper Series, SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2302568>.
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the authors would consider ‘appropriate’ protec-
tions. Thus, in the case of data subject consent as
a legitimate ground for processing personal data,
thedata subject’s self-determineddecision toagree
to processing his own datamay prevail over a pos-
sible lack of protection for his personal data.93
Dispelling the infallibility of consent in research gov-
ernance is not only beneficial from the standpoint of
effectuating more meaningful and dynamic protec-
tion of individuals’ interests and rights. It is also of
particular benefit to the social sciences research com-
munity given the often criticised, but legally unchal-
lenged, imposition of a biomedical and clinical style
of research governance which favours obtaining in-
formed consent.94 Unlike the prescribed nature of
much biomedical and clinical research, social sci-
ences research does not presuppose the outcomes of
a particular project; rather, outcomes evolve and
emerge throughout.95 This makes it particularly dif-
ficult to convey the level of information necessary
for consent to be valid under current legal require-
ments and certainly so under the drafts being con-
sidered for the GDPR. Where consent would be ap-
propriate to obtain for social sciences research, the
general approach recently adopted by the Council
navigates the issues in a more nuanced and propor-
tionate manner.96
What remains more problematic for social sci-
ences research is the enlargement of the concept of
identifiability and thus personal data, which would
treat pseudonymous data as a subset of personal da-
ta. Unlike the more proportionate approach provid-
ed for under the DPD and advocated earlier by the
Article 29Working Party in its 2007 guidance on per-
sonal data, the GDPRwould apply fully to the robust-
ly de-identifieddata usedbyADRNfor research, even
where ‘identification is not supposed or expected to
take place under any circumstance, and appropriate
technical measures (e.g. cryptographic, irreversible
hashing) have been put in place to prevent that from
happening.’97 This disrupts currently sanctioned un-
derstandings of anonymisation and identifiability in
theUK, but also if one considers the Article 29Work-
ing Party’s own guidance on personal data.98 While
the singling out of individuals for the purpose of tak-
ing decisions or otherwise significantly them should
indeed be regulated, the standard for identifiability
offered in the GDPR is seemingly disconnected with
this concern. It therefore remains unclear how the
inclusion of ‘singling out’ will work alongside Parlia-
ment’s ambiguous definition of pseudonymous da-
ta,99or indeed the inconsistencies posedby theCoun-
cil’s general approach to pseudonymisation which
seemingly recognises the importance of incentivis-
ing privacy protecting mechanisms while still apply-
ing the full force of the GDPR upon such process-
ing.100
It is welcome to see that the GDPR will formally
recognise limits to anonymisation and the specific
risks presented by pseudonymised, individual level
data (as opposed to aggregated, population level da-
ta). However, the approach taken to pseudonymous
data in the Parliament’s and theCouncil’s drafts lacks
nuance and proportionate consideration of the nec-
essarily varied circumstances under which data are
de-identified, by different types of processes, for dif-
ferent purposes and by different data controllers.
Whereas the current legal position technically allows
for such context sensitive determinations, the GDPR
would not. Amore proportionate approach would al-
low consideration of the specific methods and pro-
cedures used by data controllers in ensuring the re-
mote and unlikely chance of re-identification when
individual level but robustly de-identified data are
93 Paolo Balboni and others, ‘Legitimate Interest of the Data Con-
troller New Data Protection Paradigm: Legitimacy Grounded on
Appropriate Protection’ (2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law
244, 246.
94 Rose Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent in Social Research: A
Literature Review’ (2005) NCRM 001 ESRC National Centre for
Research Methods <http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/85/1/
MethodsReviewPaperNCRM-001.pdf>; Rose Wiles and others,
‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following Rules or
Striking Balances?’ (2007) 12 Sociological Research Online
<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/2/wiles.html>; Rose Wiles
and others, ‘The Management of Confidentiality and Anonymity
in Social Research’ (2008) 11 International Journal of Social
Research Methodology 417; Dingwall (n 89); Sarah Dyer and
David Demeritt, ‘Un-Ethical Review? Why It Is Wrong to Apply
the Medical Model of Research Governance to Human Geogra-
phy’ (2009) 33 Progress in Human Geography 46; Erdos, ‘Stuck in
the Thicket? Social Research under the First Data Protection
Principle’ (n 89); Kristian Pollock, ‘Procedure versus Process:
Ethical Paradigms and the Conduct of Qualitative Research’
(2012) 13 BMC Medical Ethics 1.
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Data Protection Principle’ (n 89) 134-135.
96 GDPR, Tripartite Version, Council, recital 25.
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used. Given that research is recognised as a valuable
form of processing in itself, and by default ‘compat-
ible’ with the original purposes of collection per
Article 5(1)(b) of the Council’s general approach, it is
surprising that clearer distinctions are not made be-
tween pseudonymous data used for research versus
other, more potentially risky purposes that are not
likely to yield public benefit. The case for social sci-
ences research remains in the balance as Europe
awaits the outcomeof final negotiations to theGDPR.
